Virtue epistemology

Virtue epistemology is a way of thinking about knowledge that focuses on the person who is learning or believing something, rather than just the belief itself. Instead of saying that knowledge is just a belief that is true and justified, this approach asks: Did the person use good thinking habits to arrive at that belief?[1][2] It says that knowledge comes from using strong mental qualities, called intellectual virtues, like being curious, fair, careful, and open-minded. These are similar to moral virtues like honesty or courage, but they help us think and learn well instead of act kindly or bravely.[3]

There are two main types of virtue epistemology. The first is called virtue reliabilism, and it was developed by a philosopher named Ernest Sosa. This version says that if you form a belief using reliable skills, like clear vision, good memory, or careful observation, and the belief is true, then it can count as knowledge.[4] Sosa also talks about two levels of knowledge: "animal knowledge" and "reflective knowledge." Animal knowledge is when you know something automatically through your senses or habits. Reflective knowledge is when you also understand why your belief is true, kind of like an archer who hits the target and knows how they did it.[5]

The second type is called virtue responsibilism, and it is linked to Linda Zagzebski and others. This version focuses more on a person’s thinking character, things like wanting to know the truth, being willing to admit when you are wrong, and taking time to understand opposing opinions.[2] It says that people earn knowledge by being thoughtful, honest, and careful in how they form beliefs. Just like someone becomes more honest by practicing honesty, a person becomes a better thinker by building these intellectual virtues through learning, practice, and encouragement from others.[6]

One of the strengths of virtue epistemology is that it helps solve problems like the Gettier problem, which showed that people could have true and justified beliefs without really knowing something.[7] Virtue epistemologists argue that real knowledge should come from skillful thinking, not just lucky guesses or beliefs that turn out to be right by accident. For example, if someone guesses an answer correctly on a test, they do not truly know it. But if someone studies, understands the material, and gets the answer right, they do have knowledge, because they used good thinking to get there.[1][5] This approach also has important lessons for school, science, and everyday life. It encourages students and citizens to develop strong habits of thought, like listening to others with respect, avoiding quick judgments, and admitting when they do not know something.[8] In a world full of misinformation, learning to think clearly, ask good questions, and check facts is more important than ever. Virtue epistemology shows that being a good thinker is not just about being smart, it is about being responsible and thoughtful.[9]

Virtue epistemology also connects with ideas from feminist and social philosophy. These areas look at how things like prejudice, trust, or power can affect who gets listened to and whose knowledge is taken seriously.[10] For example, if someone is not believed just because of their background or identity, that is called testimonial injustice. This not only hurts that person, but also blocks others from learning the truth. Virtue epistemology says that part of being a good thinker is recognizing and correcting these unfair situations.[11][12] Some people criticize virtue epistemology because it can seem like it is going in a circle, defining knowledge by saying it comes from virtues, and then defining virtues as what gives us knowledge.[13] But supporters say these intellectual virtues can be studied, taught, and practiced in real life, just like we teach students to be honest or respectful.[2][8]

References

  1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 Greco, John (2010). Achieving knowledge: a virtue-theoretic account of epistemic normativity. Cambridge New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-19391-7.
  2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 Zagzebski, Linda Trinkaus (1996). Virtues of the mind: an inquiry into the nature of virtue and the ethical foundations of knowledge. New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-57060-2.
  3. ↑ Roberts, Robert C. (2009). Intellectual Virtues: An Essay in Regulative Epistemology. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-957570-1.
  4. ↑ Sosa, Ernest (1991). Knowledge in perspective: selected essays in epistemology. Cambridge [England] ; New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-35628-2.
  5. ↑ 5.0 5.1 Sosa, Ernest (2009), Apt belief and reflective knowledge. 1: A virtue epistemology (1st ed.), Oxford: Clarendon Press, ISBN 978-0-19-956820-8
  6. ↑ Montmarquet, James A. (1993). Epistemic virtue and doxastic responsibility. Studies in epistemology and cognitive theory. Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield. ISBN 978-0-8476-7763-4.
  7. ↑ Gettier, E. L. (1963-06-01). "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?". Analysis. 23 (6): 121–123. doi:10.1093/analys/23.6.121. ISSN 0003-2638.
  8. ↑ 8.0 8.1 Baehr, Jason S. (2012). The inquiring mind: on intellectual virtues and virtue epistemology (First published in paperback ed.). Oxford New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-965929-6.
  9. ↑ Battaly, Heather (2008). "Virtue Epistemology". Philosophy Compass. 3 (4): 639–663. doi:10.1111/j.1747-9991.2008.00146.x. ISSN 1747-9991.
  10. ↑ Fricker, Miranda (2011). Epistemic injustice: power and the ethics of knowing (Repr ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-957052-2.
  11. ↑ Code, Lorraine (2019-12-31). What Can She Know?: Feminist Theory and the Construction of Knowledge. Cornell University Press. doi:10.7591/9781501735738. ISBN 978-1-5017-3573-8.
  12. ↑ Medina, José (2013). The epistemology of resistance: gender and racial oppression, epistemic injustice, and resistant imaginations. Studies in feminist philosophy. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-992902-3.
  13. ↑ Kvanvig, Jonathan L. (2007). The value of knowledge and the pursuit of understanding. Cambridge studies in philosophy (Digitally printed version ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-03786-0.
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